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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

* * * * * * *
RUSSELL CAPSON and
PEGGY CAPSON, his wife,

)
)
)

Plaintiffs and
Respondents,

)
)

APPEAL BRIEF

)

vs.

)
)

CLIFFORD M. BRISBOIS and
)
SHIRLEY G. BRISBOIS, his wife,)
and TRACY REALTY COMPANY,
)
)
a Utah corporation,

Case No. 15746

)

Defendants and
Appellant.

)
)

* * * * * * *
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE

Appellant appeals from an "Order Releasing Funds Deposited With The Court" wherein the trial court denied
Appellant's motion for costs and attorneys fees incurred
in bringing the interpleader action pursuant to which the
Order was issued.
II.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

The Trial Court ordered, pursuant to plaintiffs' motion,
that the fund deposited with the court by the Appellant be
released to plaintiffs through their counsel.

In so order-

ing the Trial Court denied Appellant's Motion for Costs and
Attorney's Fees.
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III.

NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Appellant seeks a ruling that it is entitled to cosb
and attorney's fees incurred in bringing this interpleader
action as a disinterested stakeholder, and that the case b;
remanded to the Trial Court to award such costs and fees ~
the Appellant.
IV.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On May 3, 197 5, Russell Cap son and Peggy Cap son, his
wife

(hereinafter "Capson"), plaintiffs below, and Clifford

Brisbois and Shirley G. Brisbois, his wife (hereinafter
"Brisbois"), defendants below, entered into an

Earnest~~

Agreement pursuant to which Brisbois agreed to purchase hoc
Cap son a parcel of land in Sandy, Utah.

( R. 1) .

A deposit

in the amount of $1,000.00 was made with appellant Tracy
Realty Company (hereinafter "Tracy Realty"), defendant
below, as an earnest money deposit with respect to said
Earnest Money Agreement.

(R. 1).

Subsequent events resuite:

in a failure to consurnma te the Agreement to Purchase. (R. l
On May 3, 1976, Russell Capson submitted to Tracy Realty a
demand for the $1, 000. 00 earnest money deposit in connectior
with the above-described transaction.

(R. 2).

On that same

date, Tracy Realty wrote to Brisbois indicating that capsor.
had made a demand for the earnest money deposit and indica·
ting that Tracy Realty would comply with said request

. th''

Wl

'

ten (10) days unless it heard otherwise from Brisbois. (R.:
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Subsequently, Tracy Realty was contacted by Shirley Brisbois
who indicated that Tracy Realty was not to release the
earnest money deposit.

(R. 8).

Thereafter, on or about August 2, 1976, Tracy Realty was
served with a Summons and Complaint in this action.

(R. 6).

On August 23, 1976, Tracy Realty filed its Answer and counterclaim and Crossclaim for Interpleader in this matter and
deposited with the court below the $1,000.00 earnest money
deposit claimed by Capson and Brisbois.

(R. 7, 10, 11).

On January 31, 1978, a judgment by default in the
amount of $10,659.80 was entered against Brisbois.

(R. 20).

On that same date, Capson filed a Motion for Order Releasing
Funds Deposited With The Court.

(R. 21).

Subsequently on

February 7, 1978, Tracy Realty filed a Motion for Costs and
Attorney's Fees and on February 9, 1978, filed an Affidavit
and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its
Motion.

(R.

24, 26, 28).

On February 10, 1978, argument with respect to Tracy
Realty's Motion for Costs and Attorney's Fees was heard
before Judge Dean E. Conder, District Judge, Third District
Court for Salt Lake county, State of Utah.

(R. 35).

As a

result of said hearing, Judge Conder issued an "Order
Releasing Funds Deposited With The Court," dated February 21,
1978, and an "Amended Order Releasing Funds Deposited With
The Court and Dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint as to Defendant Tracy Realty Company," dated March 23, 1978.

(R. 37,

4 8) .
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In both the Order and Amended Order, Judge Conder
denied appellant's request for costs and attorney's fees
incurred incident to depositing the funds into court pursuant to the interpleader action.
V.
A.

(R. 37, 48).

ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION

This case appears to be one of first impression before
this court.

As noted in the Statement of Facts, in the

court below, Appellant, Tracy Realty Company (Tracy Realty)
interpleaded certain parties to an earnest money agreement
for the purpose of determining rights in an earnest money
deposit which Tracy Realty held as a disinterested stakeholder.

Tracy Realty incurred costs and attorney's fees as

a result of the interpleader action and sought to recover
the same upon judgment of the case.

(R. 26).

Tracy Realty's

motion to this effect was denied by the trial court on the
ground that costs and attorney's fees are not recoverable u
the absence of statute or contract providing therefore.
The issues presented for determination by this Court
are whether the trial court has equitable power to grant
attorney's fees and costs to Appellant, Tracy

Realty;

whether the court below abused its discretion in denying
costs and attorney's fees to Appellant;

and whether such

costs and attorney's fee are recoverable out of the fund
deposited by Appellant with the lower court.
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B.

APPELLANT, TRACY REALTY, IS ENTITLED
TO RECOVER REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES
AND COSTS UNDER THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINE
OF "COMMON FUND."

1.

The "Common Fund Doctrine" Is A
Recognized Exception To The "NoAttorney-Fees Rule."

Under common law there are no provisions for attorney's
fees and costs.

Thus, many jurisdictions hold that in the

absence of statute or contract providing therefore, attarney's fees and costs will not be awarded, and each party
will be required to bear his own expenses.
556 P.2d 498

(Utah 1976); B

&

Cluff v. Culmer,

R Supply Company v. Bringhurst,

28 Utah 2d 442, 503 P.2d 1216 (1972); Blake v. Blake, 17
Utah 2d 369, 412 P.2d 454 (1966).
However, there is a recognized exception to the noattorney-fees rule known as the equitable "common fund" doctrine.

This rule states that a court of equity is deemed to

have powers to award costs and counsel fees in its discretion, in an appropriate situation, and may properly do so
where a

party has, at his own expense, maintained a sue-

cessful suit for the preservation, protection, or increase
of a common fund or, at his own expense, has created or
brought into court a fund in which others may share.
Buford v. Tobacco Growers Co-op Association, 42 F.2d 791,
792 (4th Cir. 1930).

The rationale behind this exception is

that awarding costs and attorney's fees out of a fund deposited with the court is not awarding such costs and fees in
the traditional sense.

"The theory, among others, is that
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the party reimbursed has acted as a trustee in the
interest.
453

~

Gold Dust Corporation v. Hoffenberg, 87 F.2d 45!,

(2nd Cir. 1937) (emphasis in text).

In an interpleader

action the party bringing the suit and depositing the funds
into the court as a disinterested stakeholder is in a real
sense a trustee for the cornrnrnon interest, and thus qualifies
to be reimbursed as such for its expenses.

The reimburse-

ment cannot be correctly categorized as "awarding costs,• u
costs properly signify payment by an adverse party, Id., and
the parties to an interpleader cannot by definition be
adverse to a disinterested stakeholder.
Thus it was held in Hsu Ying Li v. Tang, 87 Wash. 2d 796.
557 p. 2d 342 (1976):
A court may also award attorney's
fees if a party meets the requirements of the common fund exception
to the no-attorney-fees rule. We
have applied this exception in cases
where the litigant created or preserved a specific fund for the
benefit of others, as well as the
litigant.
(Citations omitted).
Id. at 344.
In Estate of Johnson, 27 Or. App. 46L 556 P,2d 969,
(1976), the Washington Supreme Court outlined the exception
as follows:
When a fund is brought into the court
through the services of an attorney or
where his services have added to or .
preserved or increased the amount being
administered, the court of primary
jurisdiction may properly allow a
reasonable compensation for his services
to be paid from the fund.
Id. at 971.
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Thus, where a disinterested stakeholder deposits a
fund with a court of equity pursuant to an interpleader
action, and does not become an adverse party to the action
the court may properly award attorney's fees and costs to
the disinterested stakeholder.

The Utah no-attorney-fees

rule referred to above is not inconsistent with this
equitable exception.

The cases cited above which support

the no-attorney-fees rule all involved adversary proceedings in law, wherein the party seeking reimbursement for
attorney's fees and costs was an adverse party.

Cluff v.

Culmer, supra., at 499 (attorney's fees sought in bringing
suit on defaulted contract); B & R Supply Co. v. Bringhurst,
supra., at 1217

(attorney's fees sought on rescission of

contract); Blake v. Blake, supra., at 456 (attorney's
fees sought in action to avoid sales agreement and warranty
deed) . The present case does not involve an adversary proceeding at law, but rather a non-adversary proceeding in
equity.

In this regard Utah law is presently unclear as

to whether attorney's fees and costs may properly be
awarded under the Utah interpleader statute.
2.

A Majority Of American Jurisdictions
Including All Federal Courts Have
Interpreted Their Interpleader Statutes
To Allow Attorney's Fees And costs
Under The Common Fund Doctrine.

The Utah interpleader statute, Rule 22, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure,

is identical to subsection (1) of the

onsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Servic
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federal interpleader statute, Rule 22, Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure,
jurisdiction)

(Subsection

(2)

deals solely with Federal

and like the federal statute,

the Utah statu:,
~~

does not have a provision allowing for attorney's fees.

withstanding the fact that there is no provision in the Sb~
ute for attorney's fees, all federal circuit courts have
interpreted the federal statute so as to allow such fees ~
disinterested stakeholders.
462

Ferber Co. v. Ondrick, 310 F.2d

(1st Cir. 1962), cert. denied 373 U.S. 911

(1962); A/S

Krediit Pank v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 303 F.2d 648

(2d Cir.

1962); Callwood v. Virgin Islands National Bank, 221 F.2d
770

(3d Cir. 1955); Board of Educacion of Raleigh

Winding Gulf Collieries, 152 F.2d 382
Oil Corp. v. Oliver,

412 F. 2d 938

Ins. co. v. Bondurant,

27 F2d.

v.

(4th Cir. 1946); Gulf

(5th Cir.

646

Coun~

(6th Cir.

1969); Mutual :i'
1928); John

Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Beardslee, 216 F.2d 457 17th
Cir.

1954)

cert. den.

348 U.S.

co. v. Miller, 139 F.2d 657

964,

(1954); NewYorkLifeb

(8th Cir.

1944); Schirmer Steve·

daring Co., Ltd. v. Seaboard Stevedoring Corp., 306 F.2d i8i
(9th Cir. 1962); Home Ins. co. v. Burns,
Cir. 1973); United Fidelity
F.2d 472

&

474 F.2d 1001 (9tr.

Guaranty Co. v. Sidwell, 525

(10th Cir. 1973).

Likewise most state courts have held that attorney's
fees and costs are allowable in interpleader actions.

The

following states have statutes similar to the Federal

ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Servic
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and Utah rules and have interpreted their statutes in accordance with the common fund doctrine, allowing attorney's
fees and costs:
123 Colo.

Colorado (CRCP Rule 22), Liebhart v. Avison,

338, 229 P.2d 933

(1951); Delaware (DCA Rule 22),

Everitt v. Everitt, 146 A.2d 338 (Del. 1958); Florida (FRCP
1.240), Miller v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 148 Fla. 1, 3 so.2d 519
(1941); Hawaii

(HRS 634-11), Manufacturers Life Ins. Co. v.

Von Hansen-Young Co., 34 Hawaii 288, Reh. Den. 34 Hawaii 316
(1937); Illinois (Ill. A.S. 110-26.2), Fireman's Ins. Co. of
Newark, New Jersey v. Newell, 10 Ill. App. 2d 371, 135 N.E.2d
116 (1956); Maine (MRCP 22), First National Bank v. Reynolds,
127 Me.

340, 143 A. 266, 60 A.L.R. 712 (1928); Maryland (B.U.

70-74), Maulsby v. Scarborough, 179 Md. 67, 16 A.2d 897 (1940);
Massachusetts
N.E.2d 400

(MCR 22) Mason v. Taylor, 351 Mass. 347, 221

(1966); Michigan (MSA 19.7603), Star Transfer Line

v. General Exporting Co, 308 Mich. 86, 13 N.W.2d 217, Cert.
Den.

323 U.S. 724

(1944); Mississippi (MCA(l972) 11-35-41,

il-35-43), Gayden v. Kirk, 44 So.2d 410 (Miss. 1950); Missouri
(AMS 507.060), John A. Moore & Co. v. Mcconkey, 240 Mo. App.
198, 203 S.W.2d 512 (1947); Montana (MRCP 22), First National
Bank of Circle

v. Garner, 567 P.2d 40 (Mont. 1977); Nevada

(NRCP 22), Mooney v. Newton, 43 Nev. 441, 187 P. 721 (1920);
New Jersey

(NJSA 48: 20-24), Sunset Beach Amusement Corp.

v. Belk, 33 N.J. 162, 162 A.2d 834
(1953)

21-1-1

(1960); New Mexico (NMS

(22)}, Employers Mutual Liability Ins. Co. of
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Wisconsin v. Jarde, 73 N.M.

371, 388 P.2d 382

(1963); New

(CPLR 1006), Bank of America v. Transpollux carriers

York

Corp.,

26 Misc.2d 524, 204 N.Y. S.2d

962

(1960); Oklahoma

(OSA 12 Section 238), Fisher v. Superior Oil Co., 390 P.~
521 (Okla. 1964); Oregon (ORS 13.120), Gresham State Bank
v. 0. K. Construction Co., 370 P.2d 726

(Or. 1962); Texas

(West's Texas Rules Ann. CP 43), Suiter v. Gregory, 279
S.W. 2d 909

(Tex. Civ. App. 1955); Washington (RCWA 4.08.15:

Hsu Ying Liv. Tang, 87 Wash.

2d 796, 557 P.2d 342 (1976),

While the interpleader statutes of California and New
Hampshire vary significantly from the federal statute they
are, nevertheless, similar in that neither specifically
provides for attorney's fees.

Like the courts indicated

above, the courts of these states have also interpreted
their statutes to allow for recovery of attorney's fees
costs.

a~

Cali!:ornia (CCP 386, 389.5), Fritschi v. Teed, 213

Cal. App.

2d 718,

29 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1963); New Hampshire

(NHCH 334: 21), Manchester Federal Savings
Waterhouse Co., 153 A.2d 918

&

Loan v. Emery

(N.H. 1959).

A number of state jurisdictions provide for attorney's
fees by statute; Alabama (ARCP 22); Connecticut (GSC
(Revised)

451-484); Georgia (GCA 37-1503); Idaho (IC 5-

321); Louisiana (LSA 4659); Pennsylvania (PPCSA §2503);
Virginia

(VC §8, 01-573); West Virginia (INC 56-10-1) ·

some

of these states allowed for attorney's fees in interple~N
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actions prior to legislation specifically providing therefore.
(D.C.

New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bidoggia, 15 F2d. 126
Idaho 1926); Edwards v. Metropolitan Life Ins. co.,

215 Pa. Super. 390, 259 A.2d 183 (1969); Pettus v. Hendricks,
113 Va.

326, 74 S.E. 191 (1912); Union Mutual Life Ins. co.

v. Linda Mood, 108 W.Va. 594, 152 S.E. 321 (1930).
There can be no doubt that the common fund doctrine is
a majority rule in the United States.

At least thirty

states and all federal courts follow this doctrine.

On the

basis of this authority, this Court should adopt the common
fund doctrine as it applies to interpleader actions and
award attorney's fees and costs to appellant in the present
action.
3.

Utah Law Is Impliedly Similar To Case
Law In Sister Jurisdictions Which Have
Adopted The Common Fund Doctrine.

Utah cases have not directly ruled upon the availability of
costs and attorney's fees in interpleader actions;

however,

in Xaycock v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 79 Utah 248, 9 P.2d
179 (1932), this Court, after discussing the dilatory tactics
of a plaintiff insurance company in an interpleader action,
stated:
The insurance company owed a duty to
the claimants of the fund . . . to
promptly pay the money into court
and withdraw from the litigation.
The failure of the insurance company
to perform such duty precludes it
from the recovery of costs and
attorney's fees incurred in the
trial of this cause . . . ·
79 l.ita:-i at 255.
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The obvious corollary to the Maycock case is that, had
the insurance company acted promptly and in good faith, lb
costs and attorney's fees would have been granted.
Thus pursuant to the Maycock rationale and the great
weight of authority from sister jurisdictions, this court
should follow the majority rule and hold that attorney's fee;
and costs are allowable to a disinterested stakeholder in a
proper interpleader action.
C.

APPELLANT, TRACY REALTY, QUALIFIES AS
A DISINTERESTED STAKEHOLDER ELIGIBLE
FOR REIMBURSEMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES
AND COSTS UNDER THE "COMMON FUND DOCTINE," AND THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN NOT AWARDING SAID COSTS
AHD ATTORNNEY'S FEES.

1.

Appellant Qualifies As A Disinterested Stakeholder.

The criteria for determining whether a party bringing
a fund into court as a disinterested stakeholder is qualified to receive costs and attorney's fees under the common
fund doctrine, is well set out in Niedermyer v. Fehl, 153
or. 656, 57 P.2d 1086 (1936)

as follows:

Plaintiff claims no interest in the fund
involved.
It appears that it is now and has
been since it offered to tender money into
cour~, willing at all times to pay the fund
involved to whomever it rightfully belongs,
as soon as the plaintiff could safely do so.
Its acts . . . have been at all times free
and above board.
Id. at 1090.

See also Gresham State Bank v. O.K. Con-

str'-lction Co., 372 P.2d 187

(Or. 1962) ·
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,..

It is clear that appellant, Tracy Realty, has met all
of the requirements set forth in Niedermyer, qualifying it
for an award of costs and attorney's fees in the present
case.

Appellant first received formal notice of Capson's

claim to the deposited funds on May 3, 1976 and immediately
sought to notify Brisbois of said claim so as to resolve
the question of which party should receive the earnest
money deposited.

(R. 8).

Appellant first received notice

of the claim of Brisbois sometime thereafter, but prior to
June 17, 1976.

Appellant was served with a Summons and

Complaint in this matter on August 2, 1976, and filed its
Answer and Crossclaim and Counterclaim for Interpleader on
August 23, 1976.

Appellant has at no time claimed or

expressed any interest in the earnest money deposited with
the court, and has been willing at all times to pay said
deposit over to the party to whom it rightfully belongs.
Further, Appellant has been neither dilatory nor obstreperous with respect to the prosecution of this cause of
action.

As set forth in the affidavit contained in the

Record at pages 26-27, as a result of the action in the
court below, the attorneys for Tracy Realty have rendered
services and incurred costs on behalf of said Appellant
with a reasonable value of $385.00 and should be compensated therefore.
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2.

Limitations On The Common Fund
Doctrine Do Not Apply To The
Appellant In The Present Case.

There are four recognized limitations placed on t~
recovery of attorney's fees and costs in interpleader
actions:
(1)

Attorneys fees will be disallowed when an
attorney or his client is an active or
adverse party in the litigation, thus
jeopardizing the beneficial use of the fund
by others (as when the liability of the
plaintiff or the amount of fund is in
dispute).
Maycock v. Continental Life
Insurance Company, 79 Utah 248, 9 P.2d 179
(1932) .

(2)

Attorneys fees will be disallowed where an
attorney or his client unreasonably delays
bringing the fund into court.
Id.

(3)

Attorneys fees will be disallowed when the
interpleader action is unwarranted. American
United Life Insurance Company v. Luckman,
21 F.Supp. 39 (S.D. Cal. 1937).

(4)

Attorneys fees will be disallowed where the
interpleader action is necessitated by the
fault of the plaintiff seeking attorneys
fees.
Gresham State Bank v. 0. K. Construction Co., 370 P.2d 726 (Or. 1962).

None of these specific limitations apply to
Tracy Realty in the present case.

appell~t

First, the appellant is

not an active or adverse party in the litigation, it has
not disputed the amount of funds so deposited and has not
jeopardized the beneficial use of fund by the parties
entitled thereto.

Second, the appellant acted reasonab~

and in due haste in bringing the contested fund into
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court, thereby avoiding any limitations regarding unreasonable delay.

Third, interpleader was clearly warranted

in the present case pursuant to Rule 22, Utah Rules of
civil Procedure, which provides for interpleader in actions
in which the moving party may be exposed to multiple or
double liability.

It is clear in the present case that

had the appellant not brought the interpleader action it
may have been liable to either Capson or Brisbois or
both, since the appellant held funds to which each party
claimed a dominant interest.

By depositing the fund with

the court, appellant avoided this exposure to double or
multiple liability as provided for in Rule 22.

Thus,

interpleader was warranted in the present case, and any
limitation in this regard is not applicable to the appellant.

Fourth, there is no evidence to suggest that the

appellant in any way caused the circumstances underlying
the bringing of the present action.

Indeed, the record is

clear that the appellant at all times stood as a disinterested
stakeholder awaiting the outcome of adverse claims to the
fund.
3.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In Not Awarding Costs
And Attorney's Fees To The
Appellant.

The foregoing limitations being inapplicable to Tracy
Realty, said appellant qualifies under the common fund
rule, and therefore it was an abuse of the trial court's
discretion to deny the costs and attorney's fees incurred
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Indemnity Company v. Puget Sound Company, Inc., 154 p. 2d
249

(2nd Cir. 1946).
Globe Indemnity, supra, involved the question of

whether a qualified disinterested stakeholder could recover
costs and attorney's fees incurred in depositing a contest;:
fund into court.

In that case the court held that "(t]he

rules as to costs and attorney's fees in an interpleader
action brought under the federal statute [Rule 22, Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure]

are no different than those that

prevail in an ordinary equity interpleader."

Id. at 250.

The court went on to point out that in ordinary equity
interpleaders the "usual practice" is to allow a disinter·
ested stakeholder reimbursement of costs and attorney's f;;•
necessitated by the interpleader.

The court held that wt,:.·

the granting of attorney's fees is within the discretioo~
the trial court,

"

. it is a discretion, which in the at·

sence of special circumstances, should be exercised in
accordance with the 'usual practice'."

Id. at 250, 251.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals is in accord.

U

United Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Sidwell, 525 F.2d 472
(10th Cir. 1975), an action by a surety to determine right'
in a subcontractor's fund,

the court held that it is the

·
· · terested
"•.isual" practi::::e to allow reimbursement
to a d isin
·
stakeholder of costs and attorney's fees incident to bring·
·
to the
ing the funds into court, and that any o b Jection
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granting of the fee by one who benefited by the funds being
brought into court is "frivolous".

Id. at 471.

This same rule adheres in the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals which has stated:

"We think that the proper rule,

in an action in the nature of interpleader, is that the
plaintiff should be awarded attorney's fees for the services
of his attorneys in interpleading."

Schirmer Stevedoring co.,

Ltd. v. Seaboard Stevedoring Corp., 306 F.2d 188, 194 (9th
Cir. 1962).
In the present case, the trial court did not follow
the "usual practice," but rather denied costs and attorney's
fees to a qualified disinterested stakeholder on the basis
of Utah's no-attorney-fees rule to which the common fund
doctrine stands as a recognized exception.

Thus, either

the trial court erroneously failed to recognize its power to
grant fees under the common fund doctrine, or it abused its
discretion in not allowing costs and fees in light of the
facts of the present case.
D.

THE COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED
BY APPELLANT TRACY REALTY SHOULD BE
AWARDED OUT OF THE FUND DEPOSITED WITH
THE COURT IN THIS MATTER.

While Utah law does not indicate from whence the award
of attorney's fees and costs should come, courts in other
jurisdictions have made it clear that such fees and costs
should be paid out of the fund deposited with the court.
Thus, we read in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bidoggia, 15
F.2d 126

(D.C.

Idaho 1926):
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Apart from this statute [federal interpleader statute] the weight of authority
would seem ~o support the view that an
interpleading plaintiff may be allowed his
costs, including reasonable attorney's fee,
out of the funds deposited with the court
(citations omitted).
In United Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Sidwell, supra,
the court ruled that "ordinarily a fund so deposited [in
an interpleader action]
fees incurred.
U.S. v. Chapman,
Id. at 475.

is chargeable with the reasonable

See Moore's Federal Practice, 1122 .16 (a!
281 F.2d 862, 870, 871 (10th Cir. 1960)."

See also Shenandoah Life Ins. Co. v. Harvey,

242 F.Supp. 680

(D.Maryland 1965), wherein the court award;:

the interpleading life insurance company its costs and
attorney's fees out of the funds deposited with the court
where the widow and a son of a deceased insured claimed
the proceeds of his life insurance policy.
In Home Ins. Co. v. Burns, 474 F.2d 1001 (9th Cir.19;;
a case involving insurance proceeds payable to a bankrupt
insured, the court specifically stated that any attorney's
fees incurred by the insurance company in depositing the
fund and in terpleading the parties should be removed from
the deposited fund prior to the fund being deposited wiD
the bankruptcy court.
Thus,

Id. at 1002.

it is clear that the weight of authority favors

granting reasonable costs and attorney's fees out of the
fund deposited with t:-ie court.

Appellant, Tracy RealtY•

'.laving fulfilled t'."le requiremer.ts of a disi:-iterested

.
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stakeholder is therefore entitled to be reimbursed from
the deposited fund.
E.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS ARISING OUT
OF EQUITY WARRANT AN ALLOWANCE OF
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES IN INTERPLEADER ACTIONS.

In the present case, Appellant, Tracy Realty, suffered
a wrong in that pursuant to an interpleader action in which
Appellant remained a disinterested stakeholder and by its
efforts to preserve a fund for those who claimed it, it incurred expenses and attorney's fees for which the law does not
provide recompense.

The maxim in equity that "equity will

not permit a wrong to be suffered without a remedy" is most
applicable here.

As stated by the Arizona Supreme Court:

Equity is reluctant to permit a wrong to
be suffered without a remedy.
It seeks to
do justice and is not bound by strict common law rules or the absence of precedents.
It looks to the substance rather than the
form.
It will not sanction an unconscionable result merely because it may have
been brought about by means which simulate
legality.
And once rightfully possessed
of the case it will not relinquish it
short of doing complete justice.
Sanders v. Folsom, 451 P.2d 612, 618 (Ariz. 1969).
Without recompense for costs and attorney's fees
incurred in a successful attempt to preserve a contested
fund until the rights of adverse parties can be determined, "complete justice" cannot be done to the appellant.
It is inequitable to require a disinterested stakeholder at the risk of otherwise facing multiple liabilities
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to deposit funds for the benefit of others without compensation for expenses incurred in doing so.

The Oklahoma

Supreme Court stated the rule as follows:
"The [Common Fund] rule rests upon the
ground that where one litigant has borne
the burden and expense of the ligitation
that has inured to the benefit of others
as well as to himself, those who have
shared in the benefits should contribute
to the expense."
Fisher v. Superior Oil, 390 P. 2d 521, 523 (Okla. 1964).
If this court adopts a rule denying attorney's

fees~

disinterested stakeholders in interpleader actions it will
doubtless have the effect of chilling interpleader actions
generally.

The practice of interpleading parties effect-

uates the important policy of judicial economy by
duplicity or multplicity of actions.

avoidi~

A denial of costs and

fees to a disinterested stakeholder bringing an interpleader
action will chill the moving party's desire to combine the
actions through interpleader and will, in the long run, leac
to a substantially increased number of separate actions
which should have been combined.

Not only will the dis-

interested party be harmed thereby, but the court system
will suffer.

Such long range effects of a denial of costs

and attorney's fees should be avoided.
Thus, the policy underlying both equity generally and
the common fund doctrine specifically weighs heavily in
favor of granting attorney's fees and costs in interpleader
actions.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

The equitable "common fund doctrine" stands as an
exception to the common law "no-attorney-fees rule".

This

exception is recognized by a majority of state courts, by
all federal courts, and is consistent with case law and
statutory law of Utah.
Appellant, Tracy Realty, qualifies as a disinterested
stakeholder and therefore is entitled to be compensated for
costs and attorney's fees incurred in depositing a fund
into court and determining the rights of parties claiming
an interest therein.

The denial of costs and attorney's

fees in the present case was an abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court.
Since bringing the fund into court benefits the adverse
parties to the action, it is well settled that reasonable
attorney's fees and costs should be taken from that fund.
Policy considerations underlying equity generally and
the common fund doctrine specifically mandate the granting
of attorney's

fees and costs to the appellant.

For the reasons above stated, Appellant, Tracy Realty,
prays that the Order of the Third District Court for Salt
Lake County, state of Utah, denying attorney's fees and
costs to the Appellant be reversed and that the case be
remanded directing payment of said costs and fees to the
Appellant from the fund deposited with the Court in the
amount of $385.00.
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DATED this

:;3~

/\day

of May, 1978.
Respectfully submitted,

-----t1/---JOSEPH W. ANDERSON
Counsel for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
oregoing APPEAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT was personally served
upon Thomas R. Blonquist, Esq., Attorney for Respondents,
at his office in the Metropolitan Law Building, Second
Floor, 431 South Third East, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111,
this

~day

of May, 1978.

~N~
JOSEPH W. ANDERSON
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